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RECENT CASES
ANTITRUST-DoCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO HELD NOT TO
BE RECOGNIZED AS A DEFENSE IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTION
TO BAR RECOVERY BY A PLAINTIFF WHO WAS A PARTY TO AN
AGREEMENT ALLEGEDLY CONTAINING TERMS IN VIOLATION OF
ANTITRUST LAWS. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp. (U.S. 1968).
During the Spring Term of 1968, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided an issue which has been' plaguing the field of
private antitrust litigation since 1900.1 To what extent does the
common law doctrine of in pari delicto2 affect the right of a
plaintiff to recover for violations of the antitrust laws? The answers
to this question have been so varied and confused that, until the
decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,3
no definite solution has been possible.
This case arose from franchise agreements entered into by
plaintiffs, four operators of "Midas Muffler Shops," with
defendant Midas, Inc. Plaintiffs charged that Midas, its parent
corporation International Parts Corp., two other subsidiaries, and
several officers and agents of the corporation, all defendants here,
had conspired to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act,4 section 3 of
the Clayton Act,5 and the Robinson-Patman Act.6 Specifically,
plaintiffs charged that the terms of the franchise agreement acted
to restrain and substantially lessen competition, and that price and
service discriminations had been granted to certain of defendants'
customers, but not to any of the plaintiffs.7 The United States
I. Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 F. 845 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900), was the first
reported case applying the doctrine in antitrust cases.
2. The term is defined as follows:
'In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis,' wlien each party is equally
at fault, the Law favors him who is actually in possession; that is, the parties
will be left where they are.
Reaves Lumber Co. v. Cain-Hurley Lumber Co., 152 Tenn. 339, 279 S.W. 257, 258
(1926).
3. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
4. 15 U.S.C. § I (1964).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
7. The alleged violations were contained in the following terms: Plaintiffs were
obligated to 1) purchase all their mufflers from defendant; 2) honor the Midas guarantee
on mufflers sold by any dealer; 3) sell the mufflers at resale prices fixed by defendants
and at locations specified in the agreement; 4) purchase all other exhaust parts from
defendant; 5) carry the complete line of Midas products; 6) refrain from dealing with any
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the basis that plaintiffs were barred by the in pari delicto
doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling on all of the
claims except that arising out of the Robinson-Patman Act. As an
alternative ground for barring the Sherman Act claim, the Court of
Appeals also ruled that defendants, because of their common
ownership, could cooperate without creating an illegal conspiracy.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari9 for the stated reason that
"[T]hese rulings by the Court of Appeals seemed to threaten the
effectiveness of the private action as a vital means for enforcing the
antitrust policy of the United States. . . ,,i In a decision marked
by five separate opinions, the Court reversed the rulings of the
Court of Appeals and declared that. the doctrine of in pari delicto
was no longer available as a defense in a private antitrust action."
Prior to this decision, the applicability of the pari delieto
doctrine, as well as other common law doctrines occasionally
pleaded in antitrust cases, 2 was the object of much confusion.
Conflicting decisions within the federal court system evidenced this
wide-spread uncertainty.'3 At the crux of this uncertainty were two
fundamental issues. The first centered on a determination of the
extent to which the common law system was intended to overlap
and influence the purely statutory remedies provided by the
antitrust legislation enacted by Congress. The second focused on an
examination of precisely what result the private action was intended
to accomplish. A study of the case law reveals how difficult it has
been to resolve these issues. 4 The case law, in turn, has engendered
a plethora of articles and notes by various scholars which further
evidence this uncertainty.' 5
of defendant's competitors. In return, defendants obligated themselves to 7) underwrite
the cost of the guarantee system; 8) allow plaintiffs the use of registered trademarks and
service marks; 9) grant to plaintiffs the exclusive right to sell "Midas" products within a
defined territory. 392 U.S. at 137.
8. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1966). For an analysis of the 7th Circuit decision, see the case note in 5 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 171 (1968).
9. 389 U.S. 1034 (1968).
10. 392 U.S. at 136.
11. Id. at 140.
12. A review of the "pass-on" defense is found in Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1964). Other defenses:
"Consent" and "Unclean hands."
13. Cases cited notes 25-26 infra, and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See, for example Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private Antitrust
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In dealing with the first problem, some courts have proceeded
on the assumption that, since Congress did not expressly declare
otherwise, common law concepts apply to antitrust cases
notwithstanding the statutory basis of the action . 6 It would appear
that this has been the view adopted by those courts which have
allowed the application of in pari delicto and other common law
defenses. By refusing to apply common law doctrines, it would
appear that other courts have treated the absence of any reference
to common law defenses as evidence that Congress did not intend
them to apply.17
Thus, we are confronted with a paradoxical situation in which
the proponents of contradictory viewpoints employ in their behalf
the very same fact-the absence of any language in the statutes as
to the application of common law defenses. This has led some writ-
ers to suggest that Congress should resolve this ambiguity by a leg-
islhtive expression concerning the applicability of common law
defenses. 8 This recommendation has gone unheeded, however, and
it has been left to the courts to undertake this clarification.
The second consideration contributing to the divergent views
surrounding the common law defenses can be viewed as a conflict
of two philosophies. On the one hand, some courts have adopted
Suits-The Defense of In Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. REv. 785 (1956), showing the
uncertainty in establishing the applicability of the defense; Note, In Pari Delicto and
Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965), the
inhibiting effect of the defenses on the private antitrust action; Comment, Limiting the
Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in Antitrust Suits: An Additional
Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 456 (1959), arguing that the call of public policy must
be given decisive weight; Comment, Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis
of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952), dealing generally
with antitrust enforcement through the private action, and the deterioration caused by
curtailing the private action.
16. See United States v. Greater Kansas City Chapter Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 82 F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D. Mo. 1949): "[T]he Sherman Anti-Trust Law was and
is but an exposition of the common law and common law doctrines in restraint of trade."
See also Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 80 N.Y.S.2d 874, 274 App. Div. 169
(1948).
17. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957):
In the face of such a policy this Court should not add requirements to burden
the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in those
laws.
Philco Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 186 F. Supp. 155, 166 (E.D. Pa. 1960):
An antitrust action is a creation of statute, unknown at common law, and to
apply common law principles indiscriminately to actions of this magnitude
could conceivably lead to grotesque results.
18. 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 456 (1959); 42 VA. L. REV. 785, 800 (1956).
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the view that the plaintiff in a treble damages action must not be
allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. 9 Notwithstanding the
public policy aspects of antitrust legislation, he must not be allowed
to recoup losses incurred as the result of an illegal agreement which
proved unprofitable. In short, emphasis is placed upon the moral
guilt of the plaintiff to the exclusion of the broader aspects of
antitrust legislation. Proponents of this view invariably seek to
apply the pari delicto doctrine as a bar to recovery in a private
action."0
On the other hand, some have adopted the view that overriding
public policy reasons behind antitrust legislation in general and the
private antitrust action in particular demand that private plaintiffs
be allowed to prosecute their claims with little regard to their own
individual involvement in the illegal scheme.2' The rationale behind
this philosophy is that vigilant and effective prosecution of
infractions of the antitrust laws benefits society as a whole by
promoting competition and open markets, and, stated conversely,
by preventing restraints of trade and monopolies. This reasoning
takes note of the fact that the private action "was designed to
obviate the need for the vastly expanded federal agency thought
necessary to supervise the regulatory scheme adequately .... [T]he
private action supplements the deterrent effect of governmental
power and encourages obedience to existing decrees. 22 The courts
adopting this view tend to overlook thepari delicto defense.23
19. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1967); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. of
Baltimore, 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694
(2d Cir. 1921).
20. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1967); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. of
Baltimore, 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953); Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, 202 F.2d 55 (3rd
Cir. 1953).
21. See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1945): "Considerations of public
policy demand court intervention in behalf of such a person, even if technically he could
be considered in pari delicto."; Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 177,
179 (E.D. Tenn. 1940), affd mem., 123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941): "IT]he agreement
cannot be used to defeat plaintiff's right of action based upon the overriding statutory
policy of the Sherman Act, if that right of recovery is otherwise clear."
22. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78
HARV. L. REv. 1241 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
23. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957):
Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such prohibited activities are
injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing private
enforcement of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect
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An examination of the case law clearly reveals these
conflicting attitudes. Between the Bishop case,24 which applied the
doctrine and the Supreme Court decision in Perma Life, which
rejected it, many diverse results have been reached by the courts. 5
But even in those decisions where a private plaintiff was allowed to
recover despite his involvement in an illegal scheme, the courts have
not expressly rejected the pari delicto defense.26 Usually, they have
found some justification for overlooking it, such as the creation of
an exception to the doctrine or an expansion of a previously
recognized exception, or a liberal construction of the statutes. For
example, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,27
the Court refused to recognize the pari delicto doctrine where the
plaintiff-wholesaler was involved in an illegal conspiracy with other
wholesalers, all of whom were dependent upon defendant as their
source of supply, since the plaintiff's misconduct occurred in a
transaction other than the one involved in the antitrust action.
In Eastman Kodak Company of New York v. Southern Photo
Materials Company,2s the Court rejected the pari delicto doctrine
because of evidence that the plaintiff had complied with defendant's
terms through business necessity. This adoption of an economic
coercion theory to mitigate the effects of the pari delicto doctrine
has subsequently been relied on by the courts to permit recovery by
a plaintiff who otherwise would have been precluded from pressing
the victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public. (citations and
footnotes omitted).
See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Lawlor v. National
Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743
(1947); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
24. 105 F. 845 (C.C.N.D. I11. 1900).
25. Cases applying the defense: Crest Auto Supplies, Inc., v. Ero Manufacturing
Co., 360 F.2d 8§6 (7th Cir. 1966); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas
Elec. Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954);
Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943).
The Crest case is of particular interest in that it was decided by the same court
which heard the original Perma Life appeal. For an insight into its influence upon that
decision, see Note, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171, 173 (1968).
26. For cases upholding validity of the defense in general, but failing to apply it, see
Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. '13 (1964); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co. of New
York v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Bales v. The Kansas City
Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964).
27. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
28. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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his claim. Notable among these cases are Bales v. The Kansas City
Star Company9 and Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California."
The Simpson case in particular and its interpretation by other
courts is of considerable importance because of the frequency with
which it is cited.3' It also provides a glimpse of how the Supreme
Court Justices have reacted to this aspect of the private antitrust
action. Faced with a plaintiff who had agreed to an allegedly illegal
consignment arrangement, the Court sought a method to permit
him to press his claim. The tenor of Justice Douglas' opinion
illustrates how a majority of the Court has resolved the two
fundamental issues discussed above.32 "There is actionable wrong
whenever the restraint of trade or monopolistic practice has an
impact on the market;..."33 Later:
The interests of the government also frequently override
agreements that private parties make. Here we have an antitrust
policy expressed in Acts of Congress. Accordingly, a
consignment, no matter how lawful it might be as a matter of
private contract law, must give way before the federal antitrust
policy?4
Although Douglas was referring specifically to consignment
agreements, and not to the pari delicto defense or coercion, his
remarks indicate that a majority of the Court is willing to give the
antitrust policy a pre-eminent position over common law
concepts.35 Basing its decision on the consignment-coercion aspects,
29. 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964).
Of course, if the plaintiffs actually were in pari delicto with the
defendants . . . .the law should leave them where it finds them. But if they
accepted the contract restrictions only in business necessity and not in any
sanction or furtherance of a trust endeavor by the Star, they would not be in
pari delicto for purposes of the right to recover ....
Id. at 444.
30. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
31. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (967); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967); Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (Ist
Cir. 1967).
32. Joining Justice Douglas in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black, Clark, and White. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Goldberg dissented, and
Justice Harlan did not participate.
33. 377 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 18.
35. For an analysis of the consignment aspect of the Simpson case, see J.A, RAHL,
Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-A Study in Antitrust Analysis, 61
Nw. U.L. REV. I (1966).
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the Court ruled that Simpson had suffered actionable damage.
Furthermore, alth6ugh the Court did not expressly state its views as
to the pari delicto doctrine, it is implied .that it was not to apply
here, since the decision placed its emphasis on the "actionable"
nature of plaintiffs damage.
When the Perma Life case was affirmed by the 7th Circuit, the
majority opinion interpreted Simpson to be a case resting purely on
the coercive nature of the consignment agreement, without need for
or reference to the in pari delicto doctrine.36 The lone dissenter,
Judge Cummings, took exception to this interpretation. It was his
opinion that the Crest decision, upon which the majority relied
heavily, had been modified by the subsequent Simpson holding;
further, that in the light of Simpson, the Supreme Court would no
longer accept the doctrine in a case such as this. Judge Cummings
pointed out that the pari delicto issue had been fully briefed before
the Supreme Court, and he was therefore forced to conclude that it
had been rejected." In light of the Supreme Court decision in
Perma Life, the dissenting opinion below was closer to the truth.
Probably sensing the confusion engendered by the divergent views
as to the meaning of Simpson, the Supreme Court undertook to
review the 7th Circuit's decision on Perma Life.
It is evident from the majority opinion written by Justice
Black3" that the Court meant to clear up completely all the
ambiguities, contradictions, questions, problems and vagaries that
have haunted the application of the pari delicto doctrine in private
antitrust actions. To achieve this end, the Court hit upon the simple
but heretofore neglected expedient of completely eliminating the
pari delicto doctrine.39
In justifying this sweeping decision, the Court relied upon two
basic theories. The first related to the public policy aspects of
36. 376 F.2d at 697; see 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. at 174.
37. 376 F.2d at 704-05.
38. Justice Black spoke for Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan,
with Justice White joining with additional observations. All five (with the exception of
Justice Brennan in the Simpson case) have consistently been aligned on the side seeking
the broadest possible application of the antitrust laws and the most restricted application
of the common law defenses to defeat private actions.
39. To what extent this decision was prompted by judicial impatience with the
failure of Congress to act is not clear. It should be noted, however, that some writers had
previously suggested this solution. See note 18 supra, and LOEVINGER, Private
Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958).
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antitrust legislation and the application of common law defenses in
antitrust actions. In the words of the Court:
There is nothing in the language of the antitrust acts which
indicates that Congress wanted to make the common law in pari
delicto doctrine a defense to treble damage actions, and the facts
of this case suggest no basis for applying such a doctrine even if
it did exist .... We have often indicated the inappropriateness
of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private
suit serves important public purposes.40
Thus the Court enunciated its position in relation to the two
fundamental issues discussed above. The majority believes that
common law defenses were not intended to overlap into this
statutory field so as to defeat the purposes of the antitrust
legislation and, in particular, the private enforcement action. The
Court describes tl'e private action as "an ever-present threat to
deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the
antitrust laws."41 It points out the "over-riding public policy in fa-
vor of competition. ' 42 To rule otherwise "would only result in
seriously undermining the usefulness of the private action as a bul-
wark of antitrust enforcement. 4 3
The second theory followed by the Court is a coercion
argument closely akin to that applied in the Simpson decision.
Plaintiffs' involvement "was not voluntary in any meaningful
sense." 4 They had to accept the illegal terms or risk losing the
franchises and an attractive business opportunity. Relying on
Simpson: "The fact that a retailer can refuse to deal does not give
the supplier immunity if the arrangement is one of those schemes
condemned by the antitrust laws. 45
The Court adds, as a modification to the coercion theory, that
even if plaintiffs did bargain for some of the terms in the franchise
agreement, they should not be blamed for seeking to minimize the
disadvantages caused by the more onerous terms demanded by the
defendant as a requisite to doing business. 46 The only relevance of
40. 392 U.S. at 138.




45. Id. at 140, quoting from 377 U.S. at 16.
46. It is precisely this modification that lies at the crux of the disagreement between
the members of the majority on the one hand, and the concurring opinions of Justices




plaintiffs' bargaining for the inclusion of certain terms is in the
assessment of damages.
At this point the Court makes a statement which at first glance
raises an inference that perhaps the pari delicto doctrine has not
been totally abandoned:
[O]nce it is shown that the plaintiff did not aggressively support
and further the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and
parcel of it, his understandable attempts to make the best of a
bad situation should not be a ground for completely denying
him the right to recover .... 1
The question at once arises, what if plaintiff did aggressively
support and further the monopolistic scheme? Does in pari delicto
then apply to deny him a treble damage recovery? It would appear,
however, that such would not be the result. The Court subsequently
responded to this question:
We need not decide however, whether such truly complete
involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could
ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of in pari delicto, for
barring a plaintiff's cause of action....4s
Although it is not a complete answer, perhaps the Court meant to
imply that a plaintiff in such a situation would indeed be barred
from a recovery, but on some basis other than the pari delicto
doctrine.
Having thus dispensed with the pari delicto issue, the Court
moved next to a consideration of the ruling by the Court of Appeals
that, because of the common ownership of the corporations,
defendants did not create a conspiracy. The Court rejected this
analysis on the basis of previous case law.49 It was held that since
defendants did business as separate entities, "the fact of common
ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that the
law imposes on separate entities."50 Furthermore, each plaintiff
could have alleged a combination between Midas and himself or
between Midas and other franchise dealers who acquiesced in the
scheme.5
47. 392 U.S. at 140.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
50. 392 U.S. at 141-42, and the cases cited therein.
51. Id. at 142.
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As was pointed out in the introduction, five separate opinions
were written in this case. Aside from that written by Justice Black,
Justice White joined the majority with his own opinion in which he
made additional comments. 2 Both Justices Fortas and Marshall
wrote their own opinions in which they concurred in the result but
not in the reasoning.5 3 The fifth was the dissent in which Justices
Harlan and Stewart joined.14 In addition to the conflict
surrounding the issues of common law encroachment and the
policy behind the private action discussed above, at the root of the
difference expressed by the other members of the Court is a
fundamental disagreement over the literal meaning of in par!
delicto.
It would appear that Justices Fortas and Marshall place
greatest emphasis on the "equal" aspect of the definition. By this
interpretation, both parties must have contributed equally to the
fault so that if placed on a scale, the faults of the two parties would
balance each other. If such were the case, then the parties would be
in pari delicto. Using this as the criterion, Fortas would not discard
the doctrine altogether. Nevertheless, he would allow plaintiffs
here to pursue their cause of action since he did not believe their
fault to "equal" that of defendants.5 5 Justice Marshall seems to
agree with this reasoning.5 1
To the contrary, however, are the views of Justices Harlan and
Stewart. They appear to attach a more liberal meaning to the
52. Justice White's comments can best be described as a proposal to replace the in
pari delicto doctrine with a respective fault approach somewhat akin to a comparative
negligence concept. Plaintiffs would be allowed to bring the action regardless of degree of
involvemetnt. Damages would then be awarded in proportion to the respective
responsibilities for the injury incurred.
53. 392 U.S. 134, 147-53 (1968).
54. Without exception, Justices Harlan and Stewart have steadfastly refused to
accept the broad policy arguments used by the Court in previous decisions dealing with
this subject. See the dissenting opinions in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 377 U.S. 13,
25; Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Company,
362 U.S. 29 (1960).
55. 392 U.S. at 148. "Clearly, petitioners here are not co-adventurers or-partners in
the franchise arrangement as a whole, and they are not barred by in par! delictb."
56. Id. at 149.
Such an approach would still require reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in this case. As this Court's opinion makes perfectly clear, the mere
fact that a party enters into an agreement containing provisions that are
violative of the antitrust laws . . . is not in itself sufficient to show that he is
equally responsible for the existence of the illegal provisions.
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doctrine, emphasizing the "fault" rather than the "equal" aspect.
Thus, they would retain the doctrine and apply it whenever both
parties have contributed to the "fault," regardless of the respective
weights of their contributions." As applied here, they would bar
plaintiffs from recovery.
Another aspect of the majority opinion which spawns
disagreement is the contention that the plaintiffs' bargaining for
certain terms in the franchise agreement was not fatal to the cause
of action. Both Fortas and Marshall maintain that if plaintiffs are
chargeable with the responsibility for the insertion of a particular
clause or restrictive covenant, they have participated in the
formation and implementation of the illegal scheme and should be
barred by pari delicto." The, dissenters agree with this contention,
since according to their view, any involvement ipso facto produces
fault from which plaintiffs cannot escape.
Harlan also expresses his views on the policy issue espoused by
the majority. He makes it quite clear that he considers the equities
of the parties to be paramount to the public interest, and that the
effect of the majority opinion will be to produce "well-compensated
dishonor among thieves."59 ,He thus voices his support for the
argument that the moral guilt-of the plaintiff overrides the public
policy reasons upon which antitrust legislation is based. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall also adopted the view that the
equities of the parties are the more important consideration."
The decision in Perma Life is .interesting for several reasons.
Of most immediate concern, it has settled the question as to the
availability of in' pari delicto as a defense in private antitrust
actions. Moreover, in doing so, it has reflected those conflicting
philosophies which have been responsible for the confusion which
created the problem and have kept it smoldering for over half a
century. More generally, it reveals the divergent views among
members of the Court as to who should bear the burden of
enforcing antitrust legislation enacted by Congress. In rejecting the
pari delicto doctrine, the Court has insured the private plaintiff an
active and important place in the enforcement of those
policies.
PETER K. NUNEZ
57. Id. at 154.
58. Id. at 148, 149-50.
59. Id. at 154.
60. Id. at 151.
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